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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ALAN VAL McDONALD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20000549-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from a conditional guilty plea to one count of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(i) 
(1998), and one count of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503 (1999), both third degree felonies. This Court 
has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's motion to suppress when 
defendant failed to demonstrate the invalidity of the warrant or the 
inapplicability of the good faith exception? 
When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, a trial court's underlying 
factual findings are reviewed deferentially and reversed only for "clear error." See State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994); State v. Wright, 1999 UT App 86, f 6, 977 
P.2d 505. Its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, allowing some "measure of 
discretion" in the application of legal standards to the facts. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-
40; Wright, 1999 UT App 86, f 6. 
2. Was the invalidity of the search warrant established as a matter of 
res judicata? 
Whether res judicata applies is a question of law reviewed for correctness. PGM, 
Inc. v. Westchester Investment Partners LTD., 2000 UT App. 20, f 3, 995 P.2d 1252. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with one count of possession of stolen property, a 
second degree felony; one count each of unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, both third degree felonies; 
and one count each of possession of paraphernalia, and interference with a peace officer 
making a lawful arrest, both class B misdemeanors (R. 1-2). Following the denial of his 
motion to suppress, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the two third degree 
felony charges (R. 106-113). The trial court sentenced defendant to three years probation 
(R. 133-36). Defendant timely appealed (R. 128). 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves the denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a 
warranted search of defendant's residence in Uintah County. See Br. of Appellant at 1. 
The events giving rise to this warranted search began with a burglary in Duchesne 
County, followed by a stop of defendant's vehicle at an administrative checkpoint in 
Wasatch County (R. 60). 
The Burglary and Administrative Checkpoint 
In May 1998, a residential burglary occurred in Duchesne County in which 
approximately fifteen firearms and several thousand rounds of uniquely labeled 
ammunition were taken (R. 60). 
On 23 May 1998 officers stopped defendant's vehicle at an administrative 
checkpoint in Wasatch County (R. 43, 60). Officers at the checkpoint recovered a .45 
caliber semi-automatic pistol, a .22 caliber pistol, and ammunition bearing the same label 
as that taken in the Duchesne County burglary (R. 60). Officers also recovered several 
articles of drug paraphernalia from defendant's vehicle (R. 59). Checkpoint officers 
arrested defendant and impounded his vehicle (R. 59). 
The Search Warrant for Defendant's Uintah County Residence 
Officers then obtained a warrant to search defendant's home in Uintah County (R. 
43, 54, 59).* Officers executed the warrant and discovered a substance that they believed 
1
 Neither the search warrant, nor the affidavit submitted in application for the 
warrant is included in the record. The record contains an "Affidavit of Probable Cause" 
(R. 55-60). That affidavit, however, seeks an arrest warrant for defendant. 
3 
to be methamphetamine, several items of drug paraphernalia, and a Colt .25 caliber semi-
automatic handgun (R. 42, 53-54, 58-59). 
The Ruling Invalidating the Administrative Checkpoint 
After the warranted search of defendant's residence, the administrative checkpoint 
in Wasatch County was apparently ruled invalid because of a notice problem (R. 42, 64).2 
Defendant then filed a motion to suppress in this case, arguing that the search warrant for 
defendant's residence was based entirely on evidence obtained at the administrative 
checkpoint (R. 41-43) (a copy of defendant's motion to suppress is attached as Addendum 
A). Defendant reasoned that the ruling invalidating the administrative checkpoint 
rendered the evidence seized from his residence "fruit of the poisonous tree" and also 
established the illegality of the warranted search as a matter of res judicata (id.). 
Defendant Fails to Appear at the Hearing on the Motion to Suppress 
The hearing on defendant's motion to suppress was originally set for 29 June 1999 
(R. 45). Defendant's counsel requested a continuance on the grounds that he had a 
scheduling conflict and that the State had stipulated to the continuance (R. 46-47). The 
trial court granted defendant's request and continued the suppression hearing to 14 July 
1999 (R. 48). 
Neither defendant nor his counsel appeared at the 14 July hearing (R. 52). 
Defendant was free on bail at the time (R. 12,16). The trial court allowed the State to 
2
 The only references to a ruling invalidating the administrative checkpoint are 
unsupported statements in defendant's motion to suppress and the State's objection to the 
motion to suppress. 
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submit its response to the motion to suppress through affidavit, rather than finding 
defense counsel in contempt and issuing a warrant for defendant (R. 52). In its opposing 
memorandum, the State argued that the warrant was valid on its face (R. 64) (a copy of 
the State's objection to the motion to suppress is attached as Addendum B). The State 
also argued that if the warrant was invalid, the good faith exception applied (R. 62-64) 
add. B. The State also submitted the affidavit of officer Dylan Rooks who participated in 
the execution of the search warrant (R. 53-54) (a copy of Officer Rooks' affidavit is 
attached as Addendum C). Officer Rooks' affidavit stated that only "a portion of the 
information contained in the affidavit of probable cause was gathered in the course of an 
administrative traffic checkpoint..." (Id.). 
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress based on the State's 
memorandum (R. 66) Br. of Appellant at Addendum E. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant fails to demonstrate any error in the trial court's ruling denying his 
motion to suppress. The record contradicts defendant's claim that the search warrant was 
the fruit of the poisonous tree and therefore invalid on its face. Even if the warrant was 
invalid, the trial court correctly applied the good faith exception. Defendant's inadequate 
briefing on this issue fails to demonstrate otherwise. 
Defendant also fails to demonstrate that collateral estoppel applies. He has not 




I. DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE ANY ERROR IN 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling denying his motion to suppress 
evidence seized at his residence pursuant to a search warrant. Specifically, defendant 
claims that the search warrant for his Uintah County residence was based entirely on 
evidence obtained at an administrative checkpoint and that the checkpoint was apparently 
ruled invalid after the execution of the warrant. See Br. of Appellant at 4. Therefore, 
according to defendant, the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant was the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree." Id. 
The State argued below that defendant "fail[ed] to address the facial validity of the 
warrant in this case" (R. 64) add. B. The State also argued that even if the warrant was 
invalid, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied (id.). The trial court 
denied defendant's motion to suppress "based on [the] State's memorandum in opposition 
and [the] cases cited therein" (R. 66). Defendant fails to demonstrate any error in the trial 
court's ruling. 
A. Defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court erred in 
finding that the warrant was facially valid. 
Defendant has not shown that the warrant was invalid because it was the "fruit of 
the poisonous tree." First, no order or ruling invalidating the administrative checkpoint 
appears in the record. Thus, nothing in the record establishes that the "tree" from which 
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the warrant was derived was even "poisonous." Rather, it appears that the parties below 
simply assumed the illegality of the checkpoint (R. 42, 64) add. B and C. 
Even assuming that the administrative checkpoint was illegal, the record does not 
support defendant's contention that the search warrant was based entirely on evidence 
obtained at the checkpoint. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the evidence before the 
trial court on the motion to suppress was that only "a portion of the information contained 
in the affidavit of probable cause was gathered in the course of [the subsequently 
invalidated] administrative traffic checkpoint..." (R. 53) add. C. Defendant did not 
offer any contradictory evidence. In fact, the search warrant and the affidavit submitted 
in application for the warrant do not even appear in the record on appeal. 
To establish that derivative evidence is the fruit of a prior illegality, defendant 
must demonstrate that the evidence "has been come at by exploitation of that illegality... 
." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 
(1963). The record demonstrates, however, that the search warrant was not based entirely 
on evidence obtained at the checkpoint (R. 53) add C. Even if the checkpoint was a 
"poisonous tree," defendant has not demonstrated that the search warrant was obtained by 
exploitation of the apparently illegal checkpoint, and thus "fruit of [that] poisonous tree." 
See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S. Ct. at 417. 
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B. Defendant has inadequately briefed the issue of whether 
the good faith exception applies. 
The State also argued below that even if the search warrant was defective, the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied (R. 62-64) add. B. The trial court 
agreed (R. 66). Defendant has not demonstrated that this ruling was erroneous. 
Defendant has inadequately briefed this issue. He fails even to list it as an issue on 
appeal, or separately discuss it in his brief. See Br. of Appellant at 1, 4-6. His argument 
regarding the applicability of the good faith exception consists of three sentences devoid 
of citation to the record or any legal authority. See id. at 4-5. His brief, therefore, fails to 
satisfy the requirements of rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and this 
Court should refuse to consider this issue. See State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT Ct. App. 305, 
1Hf 25,27, 989 P.2d 503 (refusing to consider inadequately briefed issue). 
In any event, a respectable body of authority supports the trial court's ruling 
regarding the applicability of the good faith exception. Several federal circuit courts of 
appeal have applied the good faith exception to a warranted search when the warrant 
affidavit contained information that was only later determined to have been 
unconstitutionally obtained. See United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1419 (8th Cir. 
1989); United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1368 (2nd Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Thornton, 766 F.2d 39, 48-49 (D.C. Cir. 1984); but see United States v. Wanless, 882 
F.2d 1459, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the good faith exception cannot apply in 
such circumstances). 
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II. DEFENDANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THE ELEMENTS 
OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
Defendant also argues that previous rulings in Wasatch and Duchesne Counties 
established the invalidity of the warranted search of defendant's Uintah County residence. 
See Br. of Appellant at 5-6. Thus, according to defendant, the issue preclusion aspect of 
res judicata, also known as collateral estoppel, prevented the State from introducing in 
this case, the evidence obtained from the warranted search of his residence. See id. 
Defendant, however, has not established the elements of collateral estoppel. 
Collateral estoppel applies if each of the four following requirements are satisfied: 
First, the issues in both cases must be identical. Second, the judgment must 
be final with respect to that issue. Third, the issue must have been fully, 
fairly, and competently litigated in the first action. Fourth, the party who is 
precluded from litigating the issue must be either a party to the first action 
or a privy of the party. 
Collins v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment, 2000 UT App 371, f 8, 16 P.3d 1251. 
Defendant fails to demonstrate the first element, identity of the issues. Defendant 
refers to previous rulings in Duchesne and Wasatch Counties. See Br. of Appellant at 5. 
There is no evidence in the record, however, of any Duchesne County ruling on the 
legality of the .warranted search of defendant's residence. The motion and order to 
dismiss entered by Judge Payne in Duchesne County, attached as Addendum D to 
defendant's brief, is not part of the record and is subject to the State's motion to strike, 
submitted with this brief. Even if defendant's Addendum D were part of the record, it 
would not establish that the issues in the Duchesne County case were identical to the 
issues in this case. Defendant's Addendum D does not even mention the search warrant 
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executed at defendant's Uintah County residence. Rather, defendant's Addendum D only 
establishes that the State dismissed its case against defendant because the evidence 
obtained at the administrative checkpoint had been suppressed. "[Djefendant bears the 
burden of demonstrating that the issue was actually decided in his favor in the [prior] 
proceeding." State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1231 (Utah 1998). Absent such a 
demonstration, defendant's assertion that collateral estoppel applies based on a Duchesne 
County ruling is simply an unsupported unilateral allegation. 
The record does mention a Wastach County ruling invalidating the administrative 
checkpoint (R. 42, 64). But that ruling is only mentioned in the fact statements of 
defendant's motion to suppress and the State's objection to the motion (id.). No ruling or 
order from Wasatch County appears in the record. The unsigned minute entry of Judge 
Bumingham in Wasatch County, attached to defendant's brief as Addendum B, is not part 
of the record and is also subject to the State's motion to strike.3 The same is true for the 
motion and order for dismissal of a case against defendant in Wasatch County, attached to 
defendant's brief as Addendum C. Thus, nothing in the record establishes that the 
validity of the warrant to search defendant's Uintah County residence was previously 
adjudicated in"Wasatch County. 
Even if these documents were part of the record they do not establish that the 
issues in Wasatch County were identical to those in this case. The Wasatch County case 
3
 The unsigned minute entry lists a Bart Woodcox as defendant and does not 
indicate that Mr. McDonald participated in the hearing. 
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apparently concerned the validity of an administrative checkpoint and the suppression of 
evidence seized pursuant to a traffic stop at that checkpoint (R. 42, 64) add. A and B. 
This case, however, concerns the legality of a warranted search of defendant's residence 
in Uintah County. While the Wasatch County ruling may collaterally estop the State from 
relitigating the validity of the checkpoint, it does not estop the State from litigating, for 
the first time, the validity of the warranted search of defendant's residence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons this Court should affirm defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this ^[5 day of April, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on 25 April 2001,1 mailed, postage prepaid, two accurate 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to: 
Michael L. Humiston 
23 West Center Street 
P.O. Box 486 





MICHAEL L. HUMISTON #6749 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 128 
Myton, Utah 84052 
Tel/Fax: (435) 646-3280 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
vs. 
Case No. 991800030 
ALAN VAL McDONALD, 
Defendant Hon. John R Anderson 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his attorney, and pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, respectfully moves the court to suppress from admission as evidence 
at trial all evidence against the Defendant obtained pursuant to warrant issued in consequence of an 
administrative roadblock held in Wasatch County on May 23,1998. 
FACTS 
1. On May 23, 1998, Defendant's vehicle was stopped at an administrative roadblock at 
milepost 43 on U.S. 40 in Wasatch County, in the vicinity of Strawberry Reservoir. 
2. Defendant was arrested at the roadblock on the basis of weapons and paraphernalia found 
in his vehicle. 
3. Inasmuch as the weapons confiscated at the roadblock appeared to match the description 
of weapons earlier reported stolen in Duchesne County, a search warrant was obtained by the 
Duchesne County Sheriffs office. The warrant was executed at Defendant's residence in Uintah 
•IV 
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County on May 28, 1998, by officers of the Duchesne County Sheriffs Department and the Vernal 
Police Department. 
4. Upon executing the warrant, officers found various weapons, drugs, and drug 
paraphernalia. In consequence of the contraband found at Defendant's residence, criminal charges 
were filed in the above-entitled matter regarding the theft of weapons and ammunition in Duchesne 
County. Charges were also filed in Uintah County in consequence of the drugs and paraphernalia 
found at the scene. 
5. On July 8,1998, Defendant filed a motion in the Fourth District Court in Wasatch County 
to suppress all evidence obtained pursuant to the administrative roadblock held on May 23, 1998, 
inasmuch as said roadblock was not established in accordance with the Utah or U.S. Constitutions, 
nor in accordance with the notice requirements governing administrative roadblocks as set forth in 
U.C.A. §77-23-100 et seq. 
6. On December 2, 1998, Judge Guy R. Bummgham of the Fourth District Court granted 
Defendant's motion to suppress. On December 3, 1998, the Wasatch County Attorney moved to 
dismiss all charges in Wasatch County arising out of the May 23,1998, roadblock. The charges were 
dismissed on or about December 9,1998. 
ARGUMENT 
As a matter of Res Judicata, all evidence obtained against the Defendant in Uintah County 
supporting charges in Duchesne and Uintah Counties must be suppressed, inasmuch as it 
constitutes the "fruit of the poisonous tree" and is tainted by the illegality of the Wasatch 
County search. 
It is well established that evidence obtained as the result of an illegal search or seizure must 
3 
be excluded. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Larocco, 
794 P. 2d 460 (Utah 1990). Likewise, the exclusionary rule applies not only to evidence obtained 
directly as result of the illegal seizure, but also to evidence obtained by exploitation of the illegality, 
unless the evidence was obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v. 
Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). The illegality of the roadblock in Wasatch County was 
established by Judge Burningham's ruling. The illegality of the original roadblock applies in 
Ehichesne and Uintah Counties as a matter oiresjudicatcL The warrant executed in Uintah County 
was based entirely on evidence obtained through the illegal roadblock. Since that evidence could not 
be admitted at trial in Wasatch County, it cannot be used as the basis for a warrant in Uintah and 
Duchesne Counties. There was no other basis for the warrant other than the evidence obtained at the 
roadblock, and thus there is no basis for the warrant sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the 
primary taint. AH evidence against the Defendant obtained pursuant to the warrant executed on May 
28, 1998, must therefore be excluded in connection with the charges in Uintah and Duchesne 
Counties. 
DATED this 12th day of April, 1999. 
Michael L. Humiston 
Attorney for Defendant 
ADDENDUM B 
Kenneth R. Wallentine, #5817 
Chief Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Telephone: (435)781-5435 
Fax: (435)781-5428 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN VAL MCDONALD, 
DOB: 10/02/1958, 
Defendant. 
Objection to Motion to Suppress 
No. 991800030 FS 
Judge John R. Anderson 
The State objects to defendant's request to suppress the search conducted pursuant to 
warrant of the 8th District Court. Defendant's argument rests entirely on the suppression of an 
administrative traffic checkpoint due to an error in providing adequate notice of the checkpoint. 
Defendant erroneously fails to address the facial validity of the warrant in this case. 
Utah courts follow the good faith exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine 
established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,922 (1984). The Utah Court of Appeals 
succinctly outlined the predicates requirements for the good faith exception in State v. Horton, 
848 P.2d 708,711 (Utah App. 1993). "Evidence obtained by officers acting in good faith, 




magistrate, need not be excluded even if the warrant is subsequently invalidated by lack of 
probable cause." Id. at 711. In determining whether the officer acted in "good faith" the 
reviewing court departs from a "presumption that when an officer relies on a warrant, the officer 
is acting in good faith." Id. at 711, citing United States v. Cardall, 111* F.2d 1128, 1133 (10th 
Cir. 1985). As established by the Affidavit of Detective Dylan Rooks, the officers involved in 
the execution of the search warrant at defendant's residence believed that they were acting on a 
facially valid court order. They are thus entitled to the presumption of good faith. 
Only four circumstances can effectively defeat this presumption, and none are present in 
the instant case. If the officer's reliance on the warrant is "wholly unwarranted" then the officer 
cannot be acting in good faith. Horton, 848 P.2d at 711. Detective Rooks' reliance on the 
warrant was well-placed. He believed that the probable cause information had been obtained in 
the course of a validly executed administrative traffic checkpoint. Affidavit of Dylan Rooks. He 
had no reason to believe or even suspect that a judge would eventually suppress evidence 
stemming from the traffic checkpoint due -not to any substantive violation of procedure or 
respect for individual rights- merely to a lack of adequate notice. In Leon, the United States 
Supreme Court characterized this possibility as an officer relying on a warrant so lacking in 
indicia of probable cause as to render reliance on the warrant entirely unreasonable. Leon, 468 
U.S. at 923. Although this is a matter of law for this Court to determine, it should be plain from 
the face of the warrant that the judge had more than sufficient probable cause to issue the 
warrant, and correspondingly, the officers had a surplus of probable cause on which to rely in 
presuming the validity of the warrant. 
The second circumstance which might defeat the presumption of good faith is found 
when the magistrate is affirmatively mislead by an officer's reckless disregard for the truth. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. There has been no allegation of any misrepresentation. A third 
possibility is the utter failure of the district court judge to remain neutral and impartial. Id. 
Again, defendant has not alleged any such gross failure on the part of the Court. The final 
condition for disregarding the presumption of good faith is when the warrant is so utterly lacking 
in particularity of description that the executing officers could not identify the property sought. 
Id. Once again, no such allegation has been raised. 
The United States Supreme Court in Leon and the Utah Court of Appeals in Horton 
adopted the presumptive good faith exception to the suppression doctrine to avoid the very 
situation sought by defendant, that is suppression of evidence obtained by a warrant later 
invalidated on a technicality. Indeed, to suppress the evidence in the present case would be 
tantamount to suppression on a hypertechnicality once removed by the attenuation of an 
interceding valid warrant. The standard for the good faith doctrine has been fully met and the 
Court ought not suppress the evidence. 
DATED this 14th day of July, 1999. 
Kenneth R. Wallentine 
Chief Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
ADDENDUM C 
Kenneth R. Wallentine, #5817 
Chief Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Telephone: (435)781-5435 
Fax: (435)781-5428 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN VAL MCDONALD, 
DOB: 10/02/1958, 
Defendant. 
Affidavit of Dylan Rooks 
No. 991800030 FS 
Judge John R. Anderson 
Dylan Rooks, having personal knowledge of the matters contained herein and being first duly 
sworn, states as follows: 
1. I was the arresting officer in the instant case. 
2. On May 28th, 1998,1 assisted in the execution of a search warrant at defendant's 
residence. Although I was generally familiar with the background facts stated in the affidavit, I did 
not participate in the preparation of the application for the search warrant. I saw the warrant before 
service and knew that it had been authorized by a judge of the 8th District Court. At the time of 
service, I believed that there was sufficient probable cause to issue the warrant and believed that the 
judge had acted correctly in issuing the warrant. I believed then and still believe that all relevant 
facts concerning the probable cause statement were included in the affidavit. I believed then and 
still believe that all statements were true and correct. 
JUL 1 n 1999 
__c!y. oi 
3. I am not aware that any person has claimed that any facts were omitted or that any 
misstatements or misrepresentations were presented to the Court in seeking the search warrant. 
4. I knew that a portion of the information contained in the affidavit of probable cause 
was gathered in the course of an administrative traffic checkpoint conducted on May 23rd, 1998, on 
U.S. Highway 40 in the vicinity of the Strawberry Reservoir. I participated in the administrative 
traffic checkpoint. I knew that it was being conducted under the direction of supervisory personnel. 
Prior to beginning the checkpoint, I attended a briefing during which the operational plan was 
carefully explained and I was told that all officers would strictly adhere to the plan. I had 
participated in other administrative traffic checkpoints and this particular checkpoint appeared to 
be conducted in full compliance with the Administrative Traffic Checkpoint Act of 1992. 
DATED this 14th day of July, 1999. 
Detecti^Dylan Rooks 
Vernal City Police Department 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF UINTAH ) 
On the 14th day of July, 1999, personally appeared before me, Dylan Rooks, who is known 
to me or who was identified with suitable personal identification, and who signed on the preceding 
document in my presence, and being first duly sworn (or affirmed), declared that the statements 
therein contained are true. 
l^OTARYPUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
